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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 22-1263
______________
CARLOS ALBERTO ERAZO-CABALLERO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
______________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-985-941)
Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 6, 2022
______________
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 7, 2022)
______________

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

*

OPINION *
______________

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

Carlos Alberto Erazo-Caballero (“Erazo”) petitions for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen his case sua sponte.
For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I
A
Erazo, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in May 2005
without having been admitted or paroled. The Department of Homeland Security
thereafter initiated removal proceedings against Erazo and served him with a Notice to
Appear (“NTA”) before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) at a time and date to be set. A
subsequent notice ordered Erazo to appear on June 22, 2005. The hearing was
rescheduled but Erazo failed to appear, and the IJ ordered him removed in absentia.
B
After Erazo was arrested in 2011, he filed a motion to reopen his removal
proceedings, contending that he failed to appear at his removal hearing because his father
failed to inform him of the hearing date. The IJ granted the motion to reopen, rescinded
the removal order, and scheduled another removal hearing. Erazo failed to timely file an
application for relief from removal, and the IJ accordingly determined that he had
abandoned the opportunity to do so. The BIA reversed and remanded, finding that his
counsel was ineffective in failing to timely file an application for relief. On remand,
Erazo failed to appear for his hearing, and, in 2014, the IJ again ordered him removed in
2

absentia.
Three years later, Erazo filed a motion to reopen his case based on changed
country conditions in Honduras, which the IJ denied and the BIA affirmed. Erazo filed a
motion to reconsider with the BIA, in which he alleged for the first time that the NTA
was defective because it omitted a date and time for the removal hearing and claimed that
the IJ therefore lacked jurisdiction. The BIA denied the motion as both untimely and
meritless. We denied his petition for review in part, holding that the BIA did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion, and dismissed it in part, concluding that his petition
improperly asked us to consider his unexhausted cancellation of removal claim. ErazoCaballero v. Att’y Gen., 810 F. App’x 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
Thereafter, Erazo filed a motion to reopen his case sua sponte with the BIA, citing
a change in the law that he asserted affected his eligibility for relief. Specifically, he
argued that under Guadalupe v. Attorney General, 951 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2020), he could
establish physical presence in the United States for the time-period needed to qualify for
cancellation of removal and that he was entitled to such relief because his removal
“would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] children.” A.R. 16.
The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Erazo had failed to establish prima
facie eligibility for cancellation of removal because he provided no “reason to hold that,
if proceedings were reopened, there would be a reasonable probability he would
demonstrate that his removal from this country would result in exceptional and extremely
3

unusual hardship to his United States citizen children.” A.R. 4. The BIA also concluded
that Erazo had not presented an “exceptional situation which warrants sua sponte
reopening,” and noted that he had not provided a reason for his failure to attend the
hearing that led to his 2014 removal in absentia. A.R. 4.
Erazo petitions for review.
II1
We generally lack jurisdiction to review BIA decisions denying motions to reopen
sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because such rulings are “committed to the
[BIA’s] unfettered discretion.” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011). 2
There are two circumstances, however, where we have jurisdiction to review such orders.
Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2017). The first is when the
BIA’s decision rests on an incorrect legal premise, in which case we may exercise
jurisdiction and remand to the BIA to apply the correct legal framework. Id. (citing
Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160). The second arises when the petitioner shows that the BIA has
“limited its discretion via a policy, rule, settled course of adjudication, or by some other
method,” and the BIA deviated from that “settled course.” Id. at 653. Neither
circumstance is present here.

1

The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), where a party files a motion to reopen that does not
comply with the requirements in § 1003.2(c), the “decision to grant or deny a motion to
reopen . . . is within the discretion of the Board.”
4
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A
First, the BIA did not apply the wrong legal standard when it assessed Erazo’s
motion to reopen his request for cancellation of removal. 3 A motion to reopen must
establish “prima facie eligibility” for the relief sought. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d
556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004). To demonstrate a prima facie case, an applicant must “produce
objective evidence showing a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that he can establish” entitlement to
relief. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
The BIA applied the prima facie standard in denying his motion. It considered the
application for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents that Erazo attached to
his motion and determined that he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for such relief
because he had not “articulated any reason to hold that, if proceedings were reopened,
there would be a reasonable probability he would demonstrate that his removal from this
country would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States
citizen children.” A.R. 4. The BIA did not require Erazo to conclusively establish
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children, but rather merely required

3

Cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents is available where an
applicant can establish that he: (A) has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than ten years immediately preceding the date of his
application; (B) has been a person of good moral character during such period; (C) has
not been convicted of certain enumerated offenses; and (D) establishes that removal
would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent,
or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
5

that he show a reasonable probability that such hardship would occur. 4
Accordingly, the BIA applied the correct legal standard, so we have no basis to
exercise jurisdiction to correct any incorrect legal premise.
B
Erazo has also not shown that the BIA has a settled course of reopening cases sua
sponte. To invoke the “settled course” basis for our jurisdiction, a petitioner “must
establish that the BIA has limited its discretion via a policy, rule, settled course of
adjudication, or by some other method.” Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 653. A “‘pattern’
of dispositions whose contours are not clearly defined or which is not tailored to the
petitioner’s circumstances” is insufficient. Id. at 653-54 (rejecting the argument that the
BIA had a pattern of reopening cases sua sponte based on one similar case and the
absence of “obvious consistency” by the BIA in this area of its case law).
In an effort to show the BIA had a settled course of adjudication when faced with
a change in law, Erazo provides seventeen BIA decisions falling into two categories:
(1) decisions in which the BIA granted sua sponte reopening for individuals seeking
cancellation of removal as a result of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), where

4

Erazo’s contention that the BIA’s citation to Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
808, 814-15 (BIA 2020), incorrectly raised the burden of proof is unfounded. The BIA
cited Matter of J-J-G- in explaining that, to qualify for cancellation of removal, Erazo
would have to demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children.
This simply cites the standard for cancellation of removal, but it does not show that the
BIA failed to appreciate that on a motion to reopen, Erazo need only show he had a
reasonable probability that he would qualify for cancellation of removal.
6

the Supreme Court held that a defective NTA did not trigger the cancellation of removal
stop-time rule and (2) decisions in which the BIA granted sua sponte reopening where
other changes in the law provided new grounds for relief.
These decisions are not tailored to Erazo’s circumstances. Of the ten post-Pereira
decisions involving a petitioner whose NTA did not stop the clock for calculating
continuous presence in the United States and who sought cancellation of removal for
nonpermanent residents under § 1229b(b), all but two found that the petitioner had made
a prima facie showing of eligibility or that included an articulation of exceptional
hardship to a family member. Although Erazo has demonstrated a change in the law
under Pereira and our decision in Guadalupe concerning the “stop time rule,” he has not
demonstrated the existence of a separate required element: prima facie eligibility for
relief. The remaining two cases, even if they were adequately tailored, are insufficient on
their own to establish a settled course of adjudication limiting the BIA’s discretion. See
Sang Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 654 (“[O]ne favorable exercise of discretion does not a
settled course make.”). Accordingly, these decisions do not establish a settled practice
from which the BIA departed.
The remaining seven decisions involve either a change in law unrelated to Pereira
or requests for cancellation of removal under a different statutory provision. These cases
are thus too dissimilar to constitute a settled course of adjudication that would apply to
Erazo’s case and are factually distinguishable because the non-citizens in these cases
7

were either found to have shown prima facie entitlement or the BIA suggested the
applicant was entitled to relief.
Consequently, Erazo has not demonstrated a settled course of adjudication that
would permit us to review the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen sua sponte. 5
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction.

5

Erazo’s reliance on Cruz v. Attorney General, 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2006),
is misplaced. In Cruz, we explicitly declined to decide whether the BIA had established a
general policy of reopening cases in situations similar to that of the petitioner, and instead
remanded due to ambiguity in the BIA’s decision. Id.
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